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ABSTRACT
Day-to-day life is inundated with attempts to control emotions and a wealth of
research has examined what strategies people use and how effective these
strategies are. However, until more recently, research has often neglected more
basic questions such as whether and how people choose to regulate their
emotions (i.e. emotion regulation choice). In an effort to identify what we know
and what we need to know, we systematically reviewed studies that examined
potential determinants of whether and how people choose to regulate their
emotions. Eighteen determinants were identified across 219 studies and were
categorised as being affective, cognitive, motivational, individual or social-cultural
in nature. Where there were sufficient primary studies, meta-analysis was used to
quantify the size of the associations between potential determinants and measures
of whether and how people choose to regulate their emotions. Based on the
findings, we propose that people’s decisions about whether and how to regulate
their emotions are determined by factors relating to the individual doing the
regulating, the emotion that is being regulated, and both the immediate situation
and the broader social context in which the regulation is taking place.
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Day-to-day life is filled with events that make us
emotional, and people often try to regulate or
control these emotions using a range of strategies
(e.g. Koole, 2009; Parkinson & Totterdell, 1999).
However, before a strategy can be implemented, the
person needs to decide whether to regulate their
emotions, and if so, what strategy they will use to
do so. But what influences these decisions? For
example, what influences whether an anxious inter-
viewee decides that they need to get their nerves
under control? If they decide to try to control their
nerves, would they choose to try to distract them-
selves and think about what they will cook for
dinner or choose to reappraise their nerves as provid-
ing an opportunity to perform better during the inter-
view? The present research reviews and organises the
empirical evidence to date in an attempt to answer
these important questions and identify what deter-
mines whether and how people choose to regulate
their emotions. We identify and discuss affective, cog-
nitive, motivational, individual, and social-cultural
determinants of both intentions to regulate
emotional responses and emotion regulation choice.
Emotion regulation is a multi-stage process (e.g.
Bonanno & Burton, 2013; Gross, 2015; Webb, Schwei-
ger Gallo, et al., 2012). For example, according to the
action control perspective (Webb, Schweiger Gallo,
et al., 2012), emotion regulation comprises three
stages – (i) identification (of the need to regulate),
(ii) selection (of whether to regulate and of an appro-
priate strategy to do so), and (iii) implementation (of
the selected strategy). During the first – identification
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– stage, the person identifies whether they need to
regulate their emotions. The identification stage
does not involve a choice, rather it reflects whether
there is a potential need to regulate emotions that
the person could then choose whether or not to
address. The need to regulate will be identified if a dis-
crepancy exists between the current and the desired
emotional state. For example, an interviewee may
want to remain calm, but feel themselves starting to
become anxious while waiting for the interview. If a
discrepancy is detected, then the individual decides
(i) whether they want and/or are able to regulate
and, if so, (ii) how to regulate from the regulatory
strategies that are known and available to them (the
selection stage). Finally, during the implementation
stage, the person attempts to put the strategy that
they have selected into action. Other models (e.g.
Gross, 2015) suggest a fourth stage – monitoring –
in which the person monitors the outcome of their
regulation and then decides whether to (i) continue
using the current strategy, (ii) switch to another strat-
egy, or (iii) to stop regulation.
Research into the selection and monitoring stages
of emotion regulation has increased over recent years,
with a number of studies examining how people
choose to regulate their emotions from the different
strategies available to them. However, as previously
outlined, the selection stage involves not only the
decision of which strategy to use but also whether
to regulate (Webb, Schweiger Gallo, et al., 2012). As
emotion regulation is a goal-directed and motivated
process (Tamir et al., 2020), the decision of whether
to regulate represents the goal or intention (where
intentions reflect self-instructions to perform particu-
lar behaviours or to obtain certain outcomes, Triandis,
1980), while the term “emotion regulation choice” has
typically been used to refer to decisions about how to
regulate (e.g. Sheppes, 2020; Sheppes et al., 2011,
2014)1 and therefore represents the means by which
the person decides to strive for that goal or achieve
the intended outcome (cf. goal systems theory, Kru-
glanski et al., 2015). In addition to choosing
between regulation strategies, people may also
choose how to use a particular strategy. For
example, having decided to reappraise people may
need to choose which specific reappraisal tactic to
use, such as whether to reappraise by trying to
accept that nothing could be done or trying to tell
themselves that things will turn out better than
expected (e.g. Vishkin et al., 2020). Consequently,
emotion regulation choice can reflect choices
between and within regulation strategies. Further-
more, as monitoring the outcomes of regulation
(e.g. whether the chosen strategy is having the
desired effect) can restart the cycle of emotion regu-
lation (e.g. prompt people to consider whether to
continue regulating and, if so, how), studies which
examine the monitoring stage of emotion regulation
(e.g. Dorman-Ilan et al., 2020) can also help us to
understand whether and how people choose to regu-
late their emotions.
The present research
Despite the importance of understanding whether
and how people choose to regulate their emotions
(for a review, see Sheppes, 2020), it is currently
unclear what influences the various decisions. For
example, when do people choose to savour good
news versus return to the task at hand? If they do
decide to change how they feel, how do they
choose between different regulatory strategies? In
an effort to answer these questions, the present
review aimed to (i) identify and organise the potential
determinants of (a) intentions to regulate and (b)
emotion regulation choice, and (ii) estimate the
strength of the relationships between these potential
determinants and intentions to regulate and emotion
regulation choice. To do so, we systematically
reviewed the evidence on the potential determinants
of these regulatory decisions in adult samples.
Potential determinants in the existing empirical
evidence were identified using a bottom-up
approach, and were then organised through a top-
down approach using an extended version of
Sheppes et al. (2014) conceptual framework. Where
there were sufficient studies (k ≥ 5), meta-analysis
was used to quantify the size of the relationships
between the potential determinants and the various
measures of intentions to regulate and emotion regu-
lation choice that have been used in empirical studies
to date.
Method
Information sources and search strategy
Three methods were used to identify studies that
could help to understand emotion regulation
choice. First, we searched Web of Science, Scopus,
and PsycInfo using combinations of the search
terms emotion / affect / regulation / control / self-
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regulation AND choice / action control / process
model. The searches were conducted in August
2020 and the same terms were also entered into Pro-
Quest to identify unpublished studies. Second, we
inspected the reference lists of the articles selected
for inclusion from the database searches for
additional studies that may be suitable (i.e. an ances-
try approach). Third, we examined papers that had
cited the articles included (as identified through
Publish or Perish software; Harzing, 2007).
Eligibility criteria
To be included in the review, the studies had to
manipulate and/or measure a factor that may
influence (i) intentions to regulate emotions or (ii)
which emotion regulation strategy (or strategies)
people select in a situation. Studies which measured
the frequency with which people use – rather than
choose – a regulatory strategy, what strategies they
typically use, or what strategies they have used to
regulate their emotions in a particular situation,
were excluded as it cannot be determined whether
the use of a strategy reflected a conscious, active
choice, rather than a more automatic response
(Sheppes, 2020).2 In addition, to ensure that
responses reflected intentions to regulate emotions,
if participants were not explicitly asked to choose
whether and/or how to regulate their emotions,
then it had to be clear that the procedure was more
likely than not to make an emotion salient that
required regulation. For example, numerous studies
have asked participants to choose between different
stimuli (e.g. music or film clips) following either a
mood induction (e.g. Taylor & Friedman, 2015) or
their current mood being made salient (e.g. Bolt,
2016). Although these studies did not explicitly
make participants aware that the choices that they
were being asked to make were intended to regulate
their emotions we could be confident that the partici-
pant’s choices likely reflected efforts to regulate those
emotions, as the choice immediately followed a pro-
cedure that rendered their emotions salient.3
Finally, the study had to focus on how the partici-
pants chose to regulate their own emotions (i.e. intra-
personal emotion regulation choice) as opposed to
how they would choose to help someone else to
regulate their emotions (i.e. interpersonal emotion
regulation choice). To be included in the meta-analy-
sis, the authors needed to report or provide sufficient
information for effect size r to be calculated. We did
not place any restrictions on the design of the study
and we considered studies with both correlational
and experimental designs for inclusion. Due to clear
evidence that there are developmental changes in
emotion regulation (e.g. Zimmermann & Iwanski,
2014), the only restriction was that the sample com-
prised adults, defined as those aged over 18.
Study selection
Studies were selected via a two-step process. The first
step involved screening the titles and abstracts of the
articles identified during the search to identify poten-
tially relevant studies. The second step involved
reviewing the full-texts of potentially relevant articles
against the eligibility criteria. Two of the authors inde-
pendently assessed whether the studies were eligible
for inclusion. There was good agreement between the
two raters, κ = .70, 95% CI [.62, .79], p < .001, and dis-
agreements were resolved by discussion. In total,
219 studies were deemed suitable for inclusion. The
flow of studies through each phase of the review is
presented in Figure 1 and Table 1 provides an over-
view of their key characteristics.
Data extraction
We started by coding how intentions to regulate and
emotion regulation choice were measured in each of
the primary studies. Participants’ intentions to regu-
late their emotions were typically measured by asses-
sing participants’motivation to repair their mood (e.g.
Wood et al., 2009) or by giving participants the choice
between passively viewing stimuli or engaging with a
regulatory strategy (e.g. Benita et al., 2019; Mehta
et al., 2017). As people choose how to regulate their
emotions both between and within different strat-
egies, emotion regulation choice was typically
measured in one of four ways: (i) measures in which
participants chose between various strategies made
available to them to regulate their emotions (e.g.
between distraction and reappraisal, Sheppes et al.,
2011); (ii) measures in which participants explicitly
chose between stimuli likely to induce different
emotions (e.g. video clips, newspaper articles, video
games, Kappes & Schikowski, 2013); (iii) measures
that reflect the amount of time that participants
spent viewing various stimuli (e.g. images or video
clips of varying valence, Sands et al., 2016) in an
effort to regulate their emotions; and (iv) measures
in which participants rated which stimuli (e.g. video
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games) they would prefer to engage with or which
specific emotions they would ideally experience in a
particular situation (e.g. Tamir, 2005; Tsai et al.,
2007). The first measure of emotion regulation
choice reflects how people choose to regulate their
emotions between different strategies, whereas the
other measures reflect choices within a regulation
strategy. For example, measuring the type of stimuli
that participants choose – or prefer – to engage
with reflects how people choose to implement situ-
ation selection, and measuring the amount of time
that participants choose to spend viewing various
stimuli reflects how people choose to modify the situ-
ation so as to regulate their emotions.
We also coded the nature of the potential determi-
nant of emotion regulation choiceexamined in each
of the primary studies using an extended version of
Sheppes et al. (2014) conceptual framework. Specifi-
cally, we categorised the potential determinants as
either affective (i.e. relating to the emotion being
regulated), cognitive (i.e. relating to cognitive
aspects associated with regulating emotions), or moti-
vational (i.e. relating to the reasons people regulate
their emotions). We also extended this framework to
Figure 1. Flow of information through each stage of the review.
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Table 1. Overview of the key characteristics of studies included in the review.
Author Study
Determinants that could potentially influence emotion
regulation choice (ERC) Category
Measure of
ERC r N
Aharon (2018) 1 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.39 44
Aharon (2018) 1 Mental health Individual ERC 2 0.34 44
Alkoby et al. (2019) 1 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.73 85
Alkoby et al. (2019) 1 Mindfulness training programme Individual ERC 2 0.06 85
Alkoby et al. (2019) 1 Nature of emotional event Affective ERC 2 0.07 85
Arens & Stangier (2020) 1 Mental health Individual ERC 3 0.37 100
Arens & Stangier (2020) 1 Personal preference for emotions Individual ERC 3 0.27 102
Arens & Stangier (2020) 1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 3 0.20 101
Bae et al. (2016) 2 Level of arousal Affective ERC 1 0.43 56
Bae et al. (2019) 2 Level of arousal Affective ERC 3 0.80 97
Bailey (2017) 1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 5 0.13 531
Bailey & Ivory. (2018) 1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 3 0.18 126
Bench & Lench (2019) 1 Level of arousal Affective ERC 3 0.09 51
Bench & Lench (2019) 2 Desire for novelty Individual ERC 3 0.21 150
Bench & Lench (2019) 2 Level of arousal Affective ERC 3 0.09 150
Bench & Lench (2019) 3 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 3 0.21 140
Benita et al. (2019) 4 Autonomy supportive vs. controlling context Social-
Cultural
ERC 1 0.22 88
Birk & Bonanno (2016) 1 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.71 90
Birk & Bonanno (2016) 1 Level of arousal Affective ERC 2 0.84 90
Birk & Bonanno (2016) 1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 2 0.84 77
Birk & Bonanno (2016) 2 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.12 95
Birk & Bonanno (2016) 2 Level of arousal Affective ERC 2 0.12 95
Birk & Bonanno (2016) 2 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 2 0.07 92
Biswas et al. (1994) 1 Gender Individual ERC 3 0.31 64
Bolt (2016) 1 Anticipation of an upcoming task Motivational ERC 3 0.15 310
Bolt (2016) 1 Reasons for listening to music Individual ERC 3 0.08 310
Bolt (2016) 1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 3 0.15 310
Bowman & Tamborini (2015) 1 Level of arousal Affective ERC 3 0.78 64
Bresin & Robinson (2015) 1 Agreeableness Individual ERC 4 0.09 77
Bresin & Robinson (2015) 1 Gender Individual ERC 4 0.10 77
Bresin & Robinson (2015) 1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 4 0.08 77
Bresin & Robinson (2015) 2 Agreeableness Individual ERC 4 0.10 120
Bresin & Robinson (2015) 2 Gender Individual ERC 4 0.07 120
Bresin & Robinson (2015) 2 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 4 0.08 120
Bryant & Zillmann (1984) 1 Level of arousal Affective ERC 4 0.51 120
Campbell (2020) 1 Sleep deprivation Individual ERC 3 0.11 52
Charles et al. (2003) 2 Age Individual ERC 4 0.24 64
Charles et al. (2003) 2 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 4 0.61 64
Chen et al. (2007) 1 Ruminative tendencies Individual ERC 4 0.35 252
Chen et al. (2007) 1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 4 0.20 252
Christ & Medoff (2009) 1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 4 0.32 84
Cohen & Andrade (2004) 1 Anticipation of an upcoming task Motivational ERC 3 0.21 117
Cohen & Andrade (2004) 2 Anticipation of an upcoming task Motivational ERC 3 0.23 129
Cohen & Andrade (2004) 4 Anticipation of an upcoming task Motivational ERC 3 0.16 126
Cohrdes et al. (2017) 2 Age Individual ERC 4 0.11 222
Cohrdes et al. (2017) 2 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 4 0.06 222
Cohrdes et al. (2017) 3 Age Individual ERC 4 0.26 149
Cohrdes et al. (2017) 3 Anticipation of an upcoming task Motivational ERC 4 0.14 149
Coleman & Williams (2013) 2 Social identity Individual ERC 3 0.30 103
Cortes et al. (2019) 2 Agreeableness Individual ERC 1 0.24 92
Cortes et al. (2019) 2 Self-esteem Individual ERC 1 0.08 92
de los Santos & Nabi (2019) 1 Specific emotions Affective ERC 3 0.43 452
DeMarco & Friedman (2018) 1 Nature of emotional event Affective ERC 3 0.27 179
DeMarco et al. (2015) 1 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 3 0.33 174
DeMarco et al. (2015) 1 Nature of emotional event Affective ERC 3 0.27 174
DeMarco et al. (2015) 2 Nature of emotional event Affective ERC 3 0.26 68
Dorman-Ilan et al. (2020) 1 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.59 28
Doukas et al. (2020) 1 Level of arousal Affective ERC 2 0.08 60
Drolet et al. (2011) 1 Age Individual ERC 5 0.23 91
Erber et al. (1996) 1 Anticipation of an upcoming task Motivational ERC 5 0.35 64
Erber et al. (1996) 1 Gender Individual ERC 5 0.23 64
(Continued )
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Table 1. Continued.
Author Study
Determinants that could potentially influence emotion
regulation choice (ERC) Category
Measure of
ERC r N
Erber et al. (1996) 1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 5 0.05 64
Erber et al. (1996) 2 Anticipation of an upcoming task Motivational ERC 5 0.27 72
Erber et al. (1996) 2 Gender Individual ERC 5 0.33 72
Erber et al. (1996) 2 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 5 0.36 72
Erber et al. (1996) 3 Anticipation of an upcoming task Motivational ERC 4 0.38 60
Feldman & Freitas (2019) 1 Intensity (of previous trial) Social-
Cultural
ERC 2 0.32 48
Feldman & Freitas (2019) 1 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.34 48
Feldman & Freitas (2019) 2 Intensity (of previous trial) Social-
Cultural
ERC 2 0.18 63
Feldman & Freitas (2019) 2 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.18 63
Fenigstein (1979) 1 Gender Individual ERC 3 0.34 87
Fenigstein (1979) 2 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 3 0.25 64
Floerke et al. (2017) 1 Affective forecasting ability Individual ERC 3 0.15 53
Floerke et al. (2017) 1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 3 0.04 53
Floerke et al. (2017) 2 Affective forecasting ability Individual ERC 3 0.16 104
Floerke et al. (2017) 2 Age Individual ERC 3 0.08 95
Floerke et al. (2017) 2 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 3 0.45 95
Friedman et al. (2012) 1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 3 0.37 129
Friedman et al. (2012) 2 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 5 0.34 35
Friedman et al. (2012) 3 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 5 0.44 93
Gendolla (2012) 1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 3 0.45 32
Gessner (2015) 1 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.81 92
Grant (2018) 1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 3 0.03 301
Greenwood (2010) 1 Gender Individual ERC 5 0.14 140
Greenwood (2010) 1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 3 0.31 140
Greenwood (2010) 1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 5 0.16 140
Hackenbracht & Tamir (2010) 1 Goal (of upcoming task) Motivational ERC 5 0.65 76
Hackenbracht & Tamir (2010) 1 Perceived utility of emotion(s) Individual ERC 5 0.24 76
Hackenbracht & Tamir (2010) 2 Goal (of upcoming task) Motivational ERC 5 0.31 57
Hannan & Orcutt (2020) 1 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.62 83
Hannan & Orcutt (2020) 1 Mental health Individual ERC 2 0.20 83
Harmon-Jones et al. (2011) 2 Attitudes towards emotions Individual ERC 5 0.28 202
Harmon-Jones et al. (2011) 5 Attitudes towards emotions Individual ERC 5 0.36 97
Harmon-Jones et al. (2018) 1 Specific emotions Affective ERC 5 0.22 155
Harmon-Jones et al. (2018) 2 Specific emotions Affective ERC 5 0.20 251
Hay et al. (2015) 1 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.66 51
Hay et al. (2015) 1 Mental health Individual ERC 2 0.04 51
Hay et al. (2015) 1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 2 0.18 51
Heimpel et al. (2002) 3 Self-esteem Individual ERC 3 0.25 116
Hershfield & Alter (2019) 3a Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 3 0.14 294
Hershfield & Alter (2019) 3b Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 5 0.18 127
Hu et al. (2020) 1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 5 0.58 95
Hu et al. (2020) 2 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 5 0.27 155
Isaacowitz et al. (2015) 1 Age Individual ERC 4 0.11 69
Isaacowitz et al. (2015) 1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 4 0.32 69
Isaacowitz et al. (2015) 2 Age Individual ERC 4 0.03 62
Isaacowitz et al. (2015) 2 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 4 0.47 62
Isaacowitz et al. (2018) 1 Goal (regulate vs. view) Motivational ERC 3 0.12 150
Isaacowitz et al. (2018) 1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 3 0.37 150
Johnson & Knobloch-
Westerwick (2014)
1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 4 0.17 168
Johnson & Knobloch-
Westerwick (2017)
1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 4 0.14 174
Johnson & Knobloch-
Westerwick (2017)
2 Group identification Individual ERC 4 0.08 152
Johnson & Knobloch-
Westerwick (2017)
2 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 4 0.10 152
Josephson et al. (1996) 1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 3 0.27 106
Kappes & Schikowski (2013) 1 Control beliefs Individual ERC 3 0.21 84
Kemp & Kopp (2011) 1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 5 0.36 96
Kim (2013) 1 Gender Individual ERC 3 0.24 226
(Continued )
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Table 1. Continued.
Author Study
Determinants that could potentially influence emotion
regulation choice (ERC) Category
Measure of
ERC r N
Kim (2013) 1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 3 0.15 226
Kim &Oliver (2011) 1 Gender Individual ERC 5 0.05 152
Kim & Oliver (2011) 1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 5 0.09 152
Knobloch (2003) 1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 4 0.23 64
Knobloch & Zillmann (2002) 1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 4 0.21 116
Knobloch-Westerwick (2007) 1 Gender Individual ERC 3 0.14 79
Knobloch-Westerwick & Alter
(2006)
1 Gender Individual ERC 4 0.24 86
Livingstone & Isaacowitz
(2015)
1 Age Individual ERC 4 0.07 146
Livingstone & Isaacowitz
(2015)
1 Goal (to view the image or regulate) Motivational ERC 4 0.14 146
Livingstone & Isaacowitz
(2015)
1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 4 0.32 146
Livingstone & Isaacowitz
(2018)
1 Age Individual ERC 4 0.24 181
Livingstone & Isaacowitz
(2019)
1 Age Individual ERC 3 0.15 225
Livingstone & Isaacowitz
(2019)
1 Level of arousal Affective ERC 3 0.16 227
Livingstone & Isaacowitz
(2019)
1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 3 0.44 226
López López & Ruiz de Maya
(2012)
1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 5 0.07 147
López López & Ruiz de Maya
(2012)
2 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 5 0.13 160
Luzon (2018) 1 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.32 40
Luzon (2018) 1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 2 0.27 40
Ma et al. (2018) 3 Culture Social-
Cultural
ERC 1 0.32 110
Ma et al. (2018) 3 Upcoming task Motivational ERC 1 0.17 110
Ma et al. (2018) 4 Culture Social-
Cultural
ERC 1 0.21 143
Ma et al. (2018) 4 Upcoming task Motivational ERC 1 0.26 143
Markovitch et al. (2016) 1 Attitudes towards emotions Individual ERC 3 0.27 59
Markovitch et al. (2017) 1 Attitudes towards emotions Individual ERC 3 0.38 68
Markovitch et al. (2017) 2 Attitudes towards emotions Individual ERC 3 0.28 66
Markovitch et al. (2017) 3 Attitudes towards emotions Individual ERC 3 0.56 45
Martins et al. (2018) 1 Age Individual ERC 2 0.28 80
Martins et al. (2018) 1 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.71 80
Martins et al. (2018) 1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 2 0.65 80
Mastro et al. (2002) 1 Level of arousal Affective ERC 3 0.20 84
Matthews et al. (in press) 1 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.76 37
Matthews et al. (in press) 2 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.77 50
Mehta et al. (2017) 1 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.44 28
Mehta et al. (2017) 3 Culture Social-
Cultural
ERC 1 0.07 81
Mehta et al. (2017) 3 Culture Social-
Cultural
ERC 2 0.19 81
Mehta et al. (2017) 3 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 1 0.58 81
Mehta et al. (2017) 3 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.40 81
Mehta et al. (2017) 2a Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 1 0.67 38
Mehta et al. (2017) 2a Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.31 38
Mehta et al. (2017) 2b Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 1 0.55 14
Mehta et al. (2017) 2b Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.25 14
Millgram et al. (2015) 1 Mental health Individual ERC 3 0.24 61
Millgram et al. (2015) 2 Mental health Individual ERC 3 0.35 65
Millgram et al. (2015) 3 Mental health Individual ERC 5 0.25 61
Millgram, Joormann, et al.
(2019)
1 Mental health Individual ERC 5 0.31 102
Millgram, Joormann, et al.
(2019)
1 Motivation to experience happiness Individual ERC5 0.28 103
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Table 1. Continued.
Author Study
Determinants that could potentially influence emotion
regulation choice (ERC) Category
Measure of
ERC r N
Millgram, Joormann, et al.
(2019)
1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 5 0.26 102
Millgram, Sheppes, et al.
(2019)
2 Goal (Decrease/increase emotion) Motivational ERC 2 0.85 37
Millgram, Sheppes, et al.
(2019)
3 Goal (Decrease/increase emotion) Motivational ERC 2 0.82 30
Millgram, Sheppes, et al.
(2019)
3 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 2 0.03 30
Millgram, Sheppes, et al.
(2019)
5 Goal (Decrease/increase emotion) Motivational ERC 2 0.86 58
Millgram, Sheppes, et al.
(2019)
5 Mental health Individual ERC 2 0.17 58
Milyavsky et al. (2019) 1 Effort Cognitive ERC 1 0.21 40
Milyavsky et al. (2019) 1 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 1 0.20 40
Milyavsky et al. (2019) 2 Effort Cognitive ERC 1 0.81 89
Milyavsky et al. (2019) 2 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 1 0.48 89
Milyavsky et al. (2019) 3 Effort Cognitive ERC 1 0.32 128
Milyavsky et al. (2019) 3 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 1 0.27 128
Murphy & Young (2018) 1 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.33 52
Murphy & Young (2018) 1 Previous choice, previous affect Individual ERC 2 0.16 52
Murphy & Young (2020) 1 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.14 68
Oliver (2008) 2 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 5 0.34 124
Oliver (2008) 3 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 5 0.35 96
Orejuela-Dávila et al. (2019) 1 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.82 109
Orejuela-Dávila et al. (2019) 1 Post-traumatic growth Individual ERC 2 0.24 109
Ossenfort & Isaacowitz (2018) 1 Age Individual ERC 3 0.31 61
Ossenfort & Isaacowitz (2018) 1 Age Individual ERC 4 0.19 61
Ossenfort et al. (2020) 1 Age Individual ERC 3 0.11 111
Ozkaya (2014) 1 Gender Individual ERC 3 0.14 144
Ozkaya (2014) 1 TV viewing habits Individual ERC 3 0.22 83
Ozkaya (2014) 1 Emotion regulation: depleted, non-depleted Individual ERC 3 0.16 83
Park (2018) 1 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.64 128
Petersen (2012) 1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 5 0.30 80
Petersen (2012) 2 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 5 0.35 61
Pletzer et al. (2015) 1 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.51 39
Pletzer et al. (2015) 1 Occupation Individual ERC 2 0.08 39
Pliskin et al. (2018) 2 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.33 101
Porat, Halperin, & Tamir
(2016)
A2 Political ideology Social-
Cultural
ERC 5 0.19 114
Porat, Halperin, & Tamir
(2016)
A4 Political ideology Social-
Cultural
ERC 5 0.23 155
Porat, Halperin, & Tamir
(2016)
B4 Perceived utility of emotion(s) Individual ERC 5 0.11 70
Porat, Halperin, Mannheim,
et al. (2016)
2 Need to belong Social-
Cultural
ERC 5 0.35 55
Porat, Halperin, Mannheim,
et al. (2016)
3 Need to belong Social-
Cultural
ERC 5 0.25 109
Porat, Halperin, Mannheim,
et al. (2016)
1a Need to belong Social-
Cultural
ERC 5 0.34 94
Porat, Halperin, Mannheim,
et al. (2016)
1a Perceived utility of emotion(s) Individual ERC 5 0.58 94
Porat, Halperin, Mannheim,
et al. (2016)
1b Need to belong Social-
Cultural
ERC 5 0.22 237
Porat, Halperin, Mannheim,
et al. (2016)
1b Perceived utility of emotion(s) Individual ERC 5 0.46 237
Porat et al. (2018) 1 Political ideology Social-
Cultural
ERC 3 0.29 118
Reinecke et al. (2012) 1 Valence of the focal emotional Affective ERC 3 0.25 111
Rovenpor & Isbell (2018) 3 Control beliefs Individual ERC 3 0.31 293
Rovenpor & Isbell (2018) 4 Control beliefs Individual ERC 3 0.31 416
Rovenpor et al. (2013) 1 Age Individual ERC 3 0.07 67
Rovenpor et al. (2013) 1 Age Individual ERC 4 0.17 67
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Table 1. Continued.
Author Study
Determinants that could potentially influence emotion
regulation choice (ERC) Category
Measure of
ERC r N
Rovenpor et al. (2013) 1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 3 0.69 67
Rovenpor et al. (2013) 1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 4 0.80 67
Sai et al. (2020) 1 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.72 31
Sai et al. (2020) 2 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.50 30
Sai et al. (2020) 3 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.75 30
Sands (2017) 2 Age Individual ERC 3 0.26 245
Sands & Isaacowitz (2017) 1 Age Individual ERC 3 0.42 59
Sands & Isaacowitz (2017) 1 Level of arousal Affective ERC 3 0.81 59
Sands & Isaacowitz (2017) 1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 3 0.42 59
Sands et al. (2016) 1 Age Individual ERC 4 0.27 60
Sands et al. (2016) 1 Level of arousal Affective ERC 4 0.09 60
Sands et al. (2016) 1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 4 0.28 60
Sauer et al. (2016) 1 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.85 75
Sauer et al. (2016) 1 Mental health Individual ERC 2 0.05 75
Sauer et al. (2016) 1 Nature of emotional event Affective ERC 2 0 75
Scheibe et al. (2015) 1 Age Individual ERC 2 0.37 77
Scheibe et al. (2015) 1 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.72 77
Scheibe et al. (2015) 1 Level of executive control Individual ERC 2 0.33 77
Schwartz et al. (2018) 1 Goal Motivational ERC 5 0.62 102
Schwartz et al. (2018) 1 Level of construal Cognitive ERC 5 0.19 102
Schwartz et al. (2018) 2 Level of construal Cognitive ERC 5 0.02 126
Schwartz et al. (2018) 2 Perceived utility of emotion(s) Individual ERC 5 0.89 126
Schwartz et al. (2018) 3 Level of construal Cognitive ERC 5 0.36 88
Schwartz et al. (2018) 3 Perceived utility of emotion(s) Individual ERC 5 0.70 88
Shafir et al. (2015) 1 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.56 27
Shafir, Guarino, et al. (2016) 1 Self-esteem Individual ERC 2 0.08 41
Shafir, Thiruchselvam, et al.
(2016)
1 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.46 24
Shafir et al. (2018) 1 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.32 29
Shafir et al. ( 2020) 1 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.86 37
Shafir et al. (2020) 1 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.82 43
Shen et al. (2020) 1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 5 0.11 180
Shen et al. (2020) 3 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 5 0.19 130
Shen et al. (2020) 4 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 5 0.03 312
Shen et al. (2020) 5 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 5 0.13 115
Sheppes et al. (2011) 1 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.83 20
Sheppes et al. (2011) 2 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.85 20
Sheppes et al. (2011) 3 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.61 16
Sheppes et al. (2014) 1 Incentives (money) Motivational ERC 2 0.61 20
Sheppes et al. (2014) 1 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.82 20
Sheppes et al. (2014) 2 Affordances Cognitive ERC 2 0.32 30
Sheppes et al. (2014) 2 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.79 30
Sheppes et al. (2014) 3 Goal (use of strategy for short-term benefits or longer-
term benefits)
Motivational ERC 2 0.46 22
Sheppes et al. (2014) 3 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.94 22
Sheppes et al. (2014) 4 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.77 22
Sheppes et al. (2014) 5 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.47 26
Sheppes et al. (2014) 6 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.82 18
Suri et al. (2015) 2 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.09 25
Suri et al. (2015) 3 Affordances Cognitive ERC 2 0.16 88
Suri et al. (2015) 3 Presence of absence of a default strategy Cognitive ERC 2 0.60 88
Szczygieł & Baryła (2019) 1 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.81 40
Szczygieł & Baryła (2019) 2 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.85 40
Tahlier et al. (2013) 1 Nature of emotional event Affective ERC 5 0.35 49
Tahlier et al. (2013) 2 Control beliefs (manipulated) Individual ERC 5 0.27 79
Tahlier et al. (2013) 2 Nature of emotional event Affective ERC 5 0.32 79
Tamir (2005) 2 Anticipation of an upcoming task Motivational ERC 5 0.23 227
Tamir (2005) 2 Neuroticism Individual ERC 5 0.17 227
Tamir (2005) 2 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 5 0.23 227
Tamir (2005) 3 Neuroticism Individual ERC 3 0.53 47
Tamir (2005) 4 Neuroticism Individual ERC 3 0.21 92
Tamir (2009) 3 Extraversion Individual ERC 5 0.41 40
(Continued )
1064 M. MATTHEWS ET AL.
Table 1. Continued.
Author Study
Determinants that could potentially influence emotion
regulation choice (ERC) Category
Measure of
ERC r N
Tamir (2009) 3 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 5 0.14 40
Tamir &Ford (2009) 1 Gender Individual ERC 5 0.29 40
Tamir & Ford (2009) 1 Goal (of upcoming task) Motivational ERC 5 0.89 40
Tamir & Ford (2009) 2 Goal (of upcoming task) Motivational ERC 5 0.96 98
Tamir & Ford (2012a) 1 Gender Individual ERC 5 0.20 175
Tamir & Ford (2012a) 1 Goal (of upcoming task) Motivational ERC 5 0.55 173
Tamir & Ford (2012a) 1 Perceived utility of emotion(s) Individual ERC 5 0.66 173
Tamir & Ford (2012a) 1 Personal preference for emotions Individual ERC 5 0.19 173
Tamir & Ford (2012b) 1 Goal (of upcoming task) Motivational ERC 5 0.35 71
Tamir & Ford (2012b) 1 Perceived utility of emotion(s) Individual ERC 5 0.25 71
Tamir & Ford (2012b) 2 Goal (of upcoming task) Motivational ERC 5 0.37 48
Tamir & Ford (2012b) 2 Perceived utility of emotion(s) Individual ERC 5 0.36 48
Tamir et al. (2007) 1 Anticipation of an upcoming task Motivational ERC 5 0.61 50
Tamir et al. (2007) 1 Perceived utility of emotion(s) Individual ERC 5 0.33 50
Tamir et al. (2008) 1 Goal (of upcoming task) Motivational ERC 5 0.84 82
Tamir et al. (2013) 1 Goal (of upcoming task) Motivational ERC 5 0.37 92
Tamir et al. (2013) 1 Perceived utility of emotion(s) Individual ERC 5 0.22 92
Tamir et al. (2015) 1 Perceived utility of emotion(s) Individual ERC 5 0.32 57
Tamir et al. (2015) 2 Gender Individual ERC 5 0.36 66
Tamir et al. (2015) 2 Perceived utility of emotion(s) Individual ERC 5 0.44 66
Tamir et al. (2015) 3 Gender Individual ERC 5 0.26 69
Tamir et al. (2015) 3 Perceived utility of emotion(s) Individual ERC 5 0.37 69
Tamir et al. (2015) 4 Perceived utility of emotion(s) Individual ERC 3 0.50 62
Tamir et al. (2015) 5 Gender Individual ERC 5 0.28 60
Tamir et al. (2015) 5 Perceived utility of emotion(s) Individual ERC 5 0.27 60
Taylor & Friedman (2014) 1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 5 0.22 88
Taylor & Friedman (2015) 1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 5 0.42 47
Taylor & Friedman (2015) 2 Nature of emotional event Affective ERC 5 0.12 172
Taylor & Friedman (2015) 2 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 5 0.39 172
Taylor & Friedman (2015) 3 Nature of emotional event Affective ERC 5 0.06 89
Taylor & Friedman (2015) 3 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 5 0.27 89
Thoma et al. (2012) 1 Control beliefs Individual ERC 5 0.13 89
Tice et al. (2001) 3 Control beliefs (manipulated) Individual ERC 4 0.39 88
Tsai et al. (2007) 4 Culture Social-
Cultural
ERC 3 0.36 140
Tsai et al. (2007) 4 Goal (leader or matcher condition) Motivational ERC 3 0.33 140
Van Bockstaele et al. (2020) 1 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.52 38
Van Bockstaele et al. (2020) 2 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.65 38
Vishkin et al. (2020) 1 Specific emotions Affective ERC 2 0.29 96
Vishkin et al. (2020) 2 Specific emotions Affective ERC 2 0.31 40
Vishkin et al. (2020) 4a Specific emotions Affective ERC 2 0.43 100
Vujović and Urry (2018) 1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 3 0.08 46
Vujović and Urry (2018) 2 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 3 0.43 90
Vujović et al. (2014) 1 Level of arousal Affective ERC 3 0.25 58
Vujović et al. (2014) 1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 3 0.86 58
Wegener & Petty (1994) 1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 5 0.28 112
Wegener & Petty (1994) 2 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 5 0.31 131
Wegener & Petty (1994) 3 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 5 0.38 19
Wilson (2018) 2 Control beliefs Individual ERC 2 0.18 202
Wood et al. (2009) 1 Self-esteem Individual ERC 1 0.12 122
Wood et al. (2009) 1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 1 0.49 122
Wood et al. (2009) 3 Self-esteem Individual ERC 1 0.09 57
Wood et al. (2009) 3 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 1 0.33 57
Wood et al. (2009) 4 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 5 0.13 62
Xue et al. (2018) 1 Valence of the focal emotion Affective ERC 5 0.52 49
Yoon et al. (2020) 1 Mental health Individual ERC 3 0.29 76
Young & Suri (2020) 1 Affordances Cognitive ERC 2 0.04 67
Young & Suri (2020) 1 Intensity of the emotion Affective ERC 2 0.04 67
Young & Suri (2020) 1 Specific emotions Affective ERC 2 0.02 67
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include individual/dispositional determinants (i.e.
relating to the individual who is doing the regulating)
and social-cultural determinants (i.e. relating to the
broader context in which the emotion regulation
attempt is taking place in). Within these broader cat-
egories, we distinguished between external and
internal variants of affective, cognitive, and motiva-
tional determinants and between trait- and state-like
variants of individual/dispositional determinants.
Whether the factors were classed as external versus
internal, or trait-like versus state-like depended on
whether the respective factor was measured or
manipulated. For example, affective, cognitive, and/
or motivational factors that were manipulated (e.g.
Josephson et al. (1996) exposed participants to sad
film clips in an effort to make them feel sad) were con-
sidered external, whereas affective, cognitive, and/or
motivational factors that were measured (e.g. Bolt
(2016) measured the valence of participants
emotions) were considered internal. Similarly, individ-
ual differences that were measured using self-report
measures (e.g. neuroticism) were considered trait-
like variants and individual differences that were
manipulated (e.g. sleep deprivation) were considered
state-like variants. It is also worth noting that some
factors have been both measured and manipulated
across different studies, such as control beliefs
(Kappes & Schikowski, 2013; Tahlier et al., 2013).
The first author extracted the relevant information
from the studies and the fourth author independently
coded approximately 10% of the studies. To assess
inter-rater reliability, Cohen’s kappa was computed
and reliability was very good across the measures
(mean κ = 0.82, range = 0.57–1.00).
Meta-analytic strategy
If sufficient primary studies examined the relationship
between a particular factor and a measure of inten-
tions to regulate or emotion regulation choice, then
random-effects meta-analysis was used to determine
the magnitude of the relationship between the ident-
ified factor andmeasure. To ensure robust estimates of
the relationships, sample-weighted average effect-
sizes were only calculated usingMeta-Essentials (Suur-
mondet al., 2017)when at least 5 studies examined the
relationship. Effect size r (Cohen, 1992) was used to
represent the strength of the relationship between
the identified determinants and themeasures of inten-
tions to regulate and emotion regulation choice in
each of the primary studies.
Where possible, the effect size was calculated by
converting the means and SDs. However, if the
mean and SD were not reported, then the available
metric (e.g. the F ratio, t ratio, chi-square) was con-
verted to effect size r or, for studies where the factor
of interest was measured rather than manipulated,
the effect size was based on the reported correlation
between the factor and the measure of emotion regu-
lation choice. When effect sizes could not be com-
puted based on information in the report, the
authors were contacted by email. Where studies
examined multiple factors that might be associated
with emotion regulation choice, the individual effect
sizes were calculated and included in the relevant
analyses. In cases where multiple effect sizes
reflected the relationship between the same factor
and emotion regulation choice in a single study, an
average effect size was calculated to maintain the
independence of effect sizes. In line with Funder
and Ozer’s (2019) guidelines, effect sizes around 0.05
were considered to be very small, 0.10 were con-
sidered to be small, 0.20 were considered to be
medium, 0.30 were considered to be large and 0.40
or greater were considered to be very large.
Heterogeneity was assessed using the Q statistic
(Cochran, 1954) and potential publication bias was
assessed using Egger’s regressions (Egger et al.,
1997). If evidence of publication bias was highlighted,
then Duval and Tweedie’s (2000) trim and fill tech-
nique was applied and the estimated effect sizes
were adjusted accordingly.4 Due to the relatively
small number of studies available for meta-analyses,
subgroup or moderator analyses were not conducted.
Results
What influences intentions to regulate and
emotion regulation choice?
Eighteen potential determinants of intentions to
regulate and/or emotion regulation choice were
identified across the 219 studies. The discussion of
these below is organised with respect to the nature
of the potential determinant – i.e. affective, cognitive,
motivational, individual, or social-cultural.
Affective determinants
We identified five affective factors that could
influence intentions to regulate and/or emotion regu-
lation choice, including the valence and intensity of
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the target emotion, along with the level of arousal, the
nature of the emotional event (e.g. whether it is self-rel-
evant, resolved etc.), and the specific emotion to be
regulated.
The valence of the focal emotion was the most fre-
quently studied factor (k = 81) and has been studied in
relation to both intentions to regulate and across all
four measures of emotion regulation choice. In
terms of how valence influences intentions to regu-
late and emotion regulation choice, it seems that
people are more motivated to regulate negative
than neutral emotions (Wood et al., 2009). Studies
have also found differences in the regulatory strat-
egies that people choose in response to positive
and negative stimuli. For example, Hay et al. (2015)
found that participants had stronger preferences for
distraction when regulating their responses to nega-
tive than when regulating their responses to positive
images. Additionally, people generally prefer to
approach positive stimuli and/or avoid negative
stimuli (Isaacowitz et al., 2015, 2018; Sands et al.,
2016; Sands & Isaacowitz, 2017; Vujović & Urry,
2018), but the valence of an individual’s emotions
can influence the stimuli that people choose to
engage with or prefer, with several studies finding a
mood-congruency effect in which participants select
(e.g. Friedman et al., 2012, Study 1; Kim, 2013) or
prefer (e.g. Erber et al., 1996, Study 1; Greenwood,
2010) stimuli that are in line with the valence of
their mood. Sample-weighted average effect sizes
ranged from medium (r+ adj = 0.21) to very large (r+
= 0.41) for the association between valence of the
focal emotion and emotion regulation choice (see
Table 2).
Fifty-eight studies examined the relationship
between emotional intensity and intentions to regu-
late and emotion regulation choice. The emotional
intensity of a situation has been most frequently
examined in relation to the choice of regulatory strat-
egy (k = 51), with studies repeatedly showing that
people typically choose to distract themselves in
response to relatively intense negative emotional situ-
ations while they choose to reappraise in response to
less intense negative emotional situations (e.g. Hay
et al., 2015; Sheppes et al., 2011, 2014). This pattern
of results has also been demonstrated in response
to positive images (e.g. Martins et al., 2018; Shafir
et al., 2018) and negative sounds (Feldman & Freitas,
2019, Study 2), words (Aharon, 2018), and shocks
(Sheppes et al., 2011, Study 3). Furthermore, this
pattern of findings has been found when the intensity
of an emotional experience is measured, rather than
manipulated (e.g. Orejuela-Dávila et al., 2019; Shafir,
Thiruchselvam, et al., 2016; Young & Suri, 2020). A
few studies have also found that the emotional inten-
sity of a situation influences intentions to regulate
emotions (e.g. Mehta et al., 2017; Milyavsky et al.,
2019) – with evidence that participants are more
willing to regulate their emotional responses to
high-intensity images compared to low-intensity
images (Mehta et al., 2017) – and that intensity influ-
ences whether people choose to switch or maintain a
regulation strategy (e.g. Birk & Bonanno, 2016;
Dorman-Ilan et al., 2020; Murphy & Young, 2020).
The intensity of the emotion was found to have a
very large-sized relationship with both intentions to
regulate (r+ = 0.46) and the choice of strategy (r+ =
0.61) (see Table 2).
Fourteen studies examined whether and how levels
of arousal influence emotion regulation choice, with
the most frequently studied outcome measure
being the stimuli that participants choose to engage
with (k = 8). The primary studies reported mixed
effects of arousal. For example, some studies found
that moderately and highly arousing stimuli were
typically viewed more than less arousing stimuli
(Sands & Isaacowitz, 2017), whereas other studies
found no differences in the frequency with which
they were chosen (Sands, 2017) or the amount of
time that participants chose to engage with the
stimuli (Sands et al., 2016). Similarly, some studies
have found that people who are stressed (i.e. high
in arousal) are more likely to choose to watch relaxing
or undemanding content compared to those who are
bored (i.e. low in arousal, Bowman & Tamborini, 2015;
Bryant & Zillmann, 1984), whereas others have not
found a difference between people who were oversti-
mulated (i.e. stressed) and understimulated (e.g. in
the selection of relaxing websites, Mastro et al.,
2002). Other studies have found that arousal interacts
with the valence of the stimuli (Vujović et al., 2014), or
the age of the individual (e.g. Sands et al., 2016) to
determine choice. Finally, there is some evidence
that level of arousal influences whether people
choose to switch to a different regulatory strategy,
with Birk and Bonanno (2016) finding that people
switch from reappraisal to distraction on more arous-
ing trials (Study 1), although arousal did not affect
when participants switched from distraction to reap-
praisal (Study 2). Taken together, there was a very
large-sized association between level of arousal and
the choice of stimuli (r+ = 0.47); however, as the
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Table 2. Sample-weighted average relationships between determinants (organised by category) and measures of intentions to regulate and emotion regulation choice.
Measure
Intentions to regulate Choice of strategy Choice of stimuli Time spent with stimuli Emotional preferences
95% CI 95% CI 95% CI 95% CI 95% CI
Category Factor r+ k LL, UL r+ k LL, UL r+ k LL, UL r+ k LL, UL r+ k LL, UL
Affective Intensity 0.46a 6 0.25, 0.63 0.61a 51 0.53, 0.68 – 1 – – – – – – –
Arousal – 1 – – 3 – 0.47a 8 0.10, 0.72 – 2 – – – –
Valence – 2 – 0.41a 6 −0.07, 0.73 0.32a 23 0.21, 0.42 0.21a,b 17 0.15, 0.40 0.22a,b 33 0.25, 0.30
Nature – – – – 2 – – 3 – – – – – 4 –
Specific emotions – – – 0.20a 6 −0.01, 0.39 – 1 – – – – – 2 –
Cognitive Affordances – – – 0.10 5 −0.03, 0.23 – – – – – – – – –
Effort – 3 – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Construal level – – – – – – – – – – – – – 3 –
Defaults – – – – 1 – – – – – – – – – –
Motivational Goals – – – – 4 – – 2 – – 1 – 0.70a 10 0.40, 0.84
Anticipation of upcoming task/situation – 2 – – – – – 4 – – 2 – – 4 –
Incentives – – – – 1 – – – – – – – – – –
Individual Individual differences – 4 – 0.18 7 0.10, 0.26 0.27a 19 0.21, 0.33 0.21a 5 0.01, 0.40 0.38a 22 0.27, 0.49
Gender – – – – – – 0.23 5 0.12, 0.33 – 4 – 0.21b 9 0.13, 0.29
Age – – – – 2 – 0.19 7 0.08, 0.30 0.17 10 0.11, 0.23 – 1 –
Mental health – – – 0.15 5 0.01, 0.29 – 4 – – – – – 2 –
Social-cultural Social context – 1 – – 2 – – 1 – – – – 0.25 6 0.19, 0.31
Cultural context – 3 – – 1 – – 1 – – – – – – –
Note. Determinants are ordered within a category by the average size of their (sample-weighted average) relationship with the measures of intentions to regulate and emotion regulation choice. k =
the number of independent tests of the association included in the analysis; r+ = sample-weighted average effect size; 95% CI = the 95% confidence interval. Confidence intervals that do not
contain zero indicate that the effect size is significant at the p < .05 level.
aIndicates that the Q statistic was significant at p < .05 suggesting that the effect sizes from the primary studies were heterogeneous. b Indicates that the sample-weighted average r+ was adjusted



















studies above illustrate, the way that arousal influ-
ences emotion regulation choice is mixed.
Nine studies examined whether and how the nature
of the emotional event affects emotion regulation
choice by measuring participants’ choice of strategy,
stimuli (often music) and/or emotional preferences.
Studies typically find that the nature of the emotional
event influences regulatory choices. For example,
studies have found differences in choices and/or pre-
ferences for music depending on whether the
emotional event that the participants is trying to regu-
late is resolved or unresolved (Tahlier et al., 2013),
whether the emotional event involves interpersonal
loss (e.g. losing a significant other) or a non-interperso-
nal loss (e.g. failing an exam, DeMarco et al., 2015), and
how the emotion is induced (e.g. reality-based vs.
fiction based, DeMarco & Friedman, 2018). However,
the self-relevance of the emotional event does not
seem to influence preferences (Taylor & Friedman,
2015). Taken together, it seems how people choose
to regulate their emotions can be influenced by the
nature of the emotional event; however, too few
studies have examined how the nature of the event
relates to specific measures of emotion regulation
choice to estimate the magnitude of the relationship
using meta-analysis.
Finally, nine studies investigated whether specific
emotions influence emotion regulation choice. For
example, different discrete emotions may influence
whether people choose distraction or reappraisal to
regulate their emotions (Young & Suri, 2020) and/or
what specific tactics they choose to reappraise.
Vishkin et al. (2020) found that people preferred to
use the reappraisal tactic of acceptance (e.g. tell them-
selves that “nothing could be done”) when regulating
sadness, but tried to think about alternative future
consequences (e.g. tell themselves that “things will
turn out better than expected”) when regulating
fear. Other studies suggest that anger influences
people’s preferences for different activities (Harmon-
Jones et al., 2018) and the information that people
choose to engage with (de los Santos & Nabi, 2019).
Taken together, there was a medium-sized association
between specific emotions and the choice of strategy
(r+ = 0.20, see Table 2).
Cognitive determinants
We identified four potential cognitive determinants of
intentions to regulate and emotion regulation choice:
Affordances or opportunities for using particular
regulatory strategies inherent within emotional
stimuli (e.g. reappraisal and distraction affordances),
cognitive effort (e.g. how difficult it was to reappraise),
construal level (e.g. low- vs. high-level construal) and
the presence of a default strategy, which refers to
the option selected if people do not decide.
Five studies examined the role of affordances on
emotion regulation choice – in each case, operationa-
lised in terms of what strategy people chose to regu-
late their emotions. The findings suggest that both
self-reported reappraisal affordances (but not distrac-
tion affordances, Young & Suri, 2020) and experimen-
tally manipulated reappraisal affordances (Sheppes
et al., 2014, Study 2; Suri et al., 2015) are associated
with a greater choice of reappraisal. Taken together,
there was a small-sized association between affor-
dances and choice of strategy (r+ = 0.10, see Table 2).
Three studies examined the role of (anticipated or
actual) effort associated with regulation on intentions
to regulate. Milyavsky et al. (2019) manipulated cogni-
tive effort in two studies by having participants make
choices that they would not implement (low effort)
and by making choices that they had to subsequently
implement (high effort). In a third study, participants
were presented with reappraisal instructions which
were more effortful to implement (i.e. rethink as posi-
tive) or less effortful to implement (i.e. rethink as fake).
The findings suggested that participants were more
likely to choose reappraisal when the cognitive
effort was reduced (Study 2); although there was
also evidence that cognitive effort interacted with
emotional intensity to determine whether people
chose to reappraise or to watch the images (Studies
1 and 3). Specifically, participants were more likely
to choose to reappraise their emotional response to
high-intensity images when the cognitive effort was
low compared to when the cognitive effort was
high. Taken together, these findings suggest that
people consider the effort required when making
regulatory decisions.
Three studies examined whether an individual’s
level of construal influenced their emotional prefer-
ences. For example, Schwartz et al. (2018) manipu-
lated the level of construal by presenting
participants with a goal (e.g. maintain a healthy
relationship) and asking them to either explain why
they wished to pursue the goal (a procedure that
invoked a high-construal level) or how they wished
to pursue the goal (a procedure that invoked a low
-construal level). The findings suggested that people
are more likely to take into account how useful
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emotions will be when they adopt a higher-level of
construal compared to a lower level of construal. For
example, invoking higher-level construals led partici-
pants to report stronger preferences for anger when
anger was thought to be useful, whereas invoking
low-level construals meant that preferences for
emotions were not influenced by how useful they
were thought to be. Taken together, these findings
suggest that an individual’s construal can influence
what emotions they prefer to experience.
Finally, only one study to date has examined the
role of defaults in shaping emotion regulation
choice. Specifically, Suri et al. (2015, Study 3) either
asked participants to choose whether to reappraise
or watch an image, or provided participants with a
default option (e.g, watch the image) and asked
whether they wanted to override and choose the
alternative option instead (if participants did
nothing, then the default option was chosen). It was
found that participants were less likely to choose to
regulate their emotions (using reappraisal) if the
default option was simply to watch the image (com-
pared to if there was no default option or the
default option was to use reappraisal). Thus, inten-
tions to regulate may be influenced by the presence
of a default option.
Motivational determinants
The primary studies considered three potential moti-
vational determinants of intentions to regulate and/
or emotion regulation choice: the goal or goals that
are salient at the point of choice (e.g. approach vs.
avoidance), the anticipation of an upcoming task,
and incentives such as money.
Seventeen studies examined whether goals
influence emotion regulation choice. For example,
studies have found differences in which strategies
people choose as a function of both temporal goals
(e.g. studies have found a greater preference for reap-
praisal for long-term vs. short-term goals, Sheppes
et al., 2014) and directional goals (e.g. studies have
found that people prefer to use distraction when
trying to decrease emotions, but rumination when
trying to increase emotions, Millgram, Sheppes,
et al., 2019). Some studies have examined the role
of more situational/instrumental goals on emotion
regulation choice. These studies typically find that
people prefer emotions that will (or they believe
will) help them to achieve a particular goal, whether
it be a positive emotion, such as preferring to
experience happiness when the goal of the task is
to collaborate with someone (e.g. Tamir et al., 2013;
Tamir & Ford, 2012a, 2012b) or a negative emotion,
such as fear, when the goal is to avoid something
dangerous (e.g. Tamir & Ford, 2009). Goals were
found to have a very large-sized relationship with pre-
ferences for emotional stimuli (r+ = 0.70, see Table 2).
Twelve studies found that anticipating an upcom-
ing task or situation was associated with intentions
to regulate and emotion regulation choice,
suggesting that people consider the nature of the
task ahead when choosing how to regulate their
emotions. Specifically, evidence suggests that
whether participants anticipate doing a task that
involves creative or analytical skills influences what
stimuli they choose to engage with (Cohen &
Andrade, 2004, Studies 2 and 4). Similarly, whether a
task is cognitively demanding (Tamir, 2005, Study 2)
or potentially threatening (i.e. an intelligence test,
Tamir et al., 2007) influences participants’ emotional
preferences. Evidence suggests that people also take
into consideration whether they will interact with
another person when choosing how to control their
emotions, and also the mood of the person that
they will interact with (Erber et al., 1996). That being
said, other studies have not found that anticipating
an upcoming task is associated with the amount of
time that people choose to engage with stimuli (e.g.
Cohrdes et al., 2017) and that the effect of anticipating
an upcoming task on intentions to regulate can
depend on the cultural background of the individual
doing the regulating. For example, Ma et al. (2018)
found that anticipating a task that requires high cog-
nitive effort led American participants to report trying
to savour (vs. dampen) positive emotions more fre-
quently than it did Asian participants. It is worth
noting that most studies to date have experimentally
manipulated whether participants anticipate upcom-
ing tasks and only one study to date has measured
what future activities people (naturally) anticipated
in their day-to-day lives at the point of choosing
what media to engage with (Bolt, 2016). Nevertheless,
these findings suggest that anticipating an upcoming
task can influence intentions to regulate and emotion
regulation choice.
Finally, only one study has examined the role of
incentives on emotion regulation choice to date –
specifically, Sheppes et al. (2014, Study 1) varied the
monetary incentive associated with using different
regulatory options between trials. Sheppes et al.
found that increasing the monetary incentive of a
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strategy increased its selection, suggesting that incen-
tives influence choice.
Individual determinants
Studies to date have considered four individual deter-
minants of intentions to regulate and/or emotion
regulation choice including demographic determi-
nants such as age and gender and also other individ-
ual determinants such as mental health and both
state- and trait-like individual differences (e.g. levels
of neuroticism, beliefs about emotions).
Twenty studies have examined the effect of age
across all four measures of emotion regulation
choice. These studies highlight age differences in
the strategies that people typically choose in
response to positive (Martins et al., 2018) and nega-
tive stimuli (Martins et al., 2018; Scheibe et al., 2015).
For example, Scheibe et al. (2015) found that older
participants showed a stronger preference for distrac-
tion than younger adults. Similarly, there appear to be
age differences in the stimuli that participants choose
to engage with (e.g. Sands & Isaacowitz, 2017) and the
amount of time that participants choose to engage
with different stimuli (e.g. Cohrdes et al., 2017; Living-
stone & Isaacowitz, 2015). That being said, the
findings were mixed, with some studies not finding
any age differences in emotion regulation choice
(e.g. Ossenfort & Isaacowitz, 2018). Sample-weighted
average effect sizes for the association between age
and emotion regulation choice were small, ranging
from r+ = 0.17 (for time spent with stimuli) to r+ =
0.19 (for choice of stimuli).
Eighteen studies examined the effect of gender on
three measures of emotion regulation choice. Studies
have found differences between males and females in
the stimuli that they choose to engage with (e.g.
Biswas et al., 1994; Ozkaya, 2014) and their emotional
preferences (Greenwood, 2010) following mood
inductions, and also the amount of time that they
choose to spend with different stimuli when expect-
ing an opportunity to retaliate (Knobloch-Westerwick
& Alter, 2006). While males and females have been
found to prefer the same emotions as a function of
the goal of the situation, women typically have stron-
ger preferences than men (Tamir & Ford, 2012a).
However, while primary studies have found differ-
ences in emotion regulation choice as a function of
gender, as with the effects of age, the findings have
been mixed. For example, some studies suggest that
females have a stronger preference for positive
(compared to negative) stimuli than males (e.g.
Tamir et al., 2015), whereas others suggest the oppo-
site (e.g. Erber et al., 1996) or have not found an effect
of gender on emotion regulation choice (e.g. Kim &
Oliver, 2011; Zillmann et al., 1980). Nevertheless,
meta-analytic results suggest that, across the evi-
dence to date, gender has medium-sized associations
with the choice of stimuli (r+ = 0.23) and emotional
preferences (r+adj = 0.21).
Eleven studies examined the association between
different mental health disorders and measures of
emotion regulation choice. These studies did not typi-
cally find differences in emotion regulation choice
across different mental health disorders including
bipolar disorder (Hay et al., 2015), borderline person-
ality disorder (Sauer et al., 2016), or major depressive
disorder (Millgram, Sheppes, et al., 2019). Other
studies have, however, found that depressed partici-
pants are more likely to choose to engage with sad
stimuli compared to healthy controls/those without
a diagnosis (e.g. Arens & Stangier, 2020; Millgram
et al., 2015, Study 1 and 2; Yoon et al., 2020). Similarly,
differences between these populations have been
found regarding the direction with which participants
choose to regulate their emotions (e.g. Millgram et al.,
2015; Millgram, Joormann, et al., 2019), although
there are inconsistent findings across studies. For
example, Millgram et al. (2015) found that depressed
participants were more likely to choose to upregulate
sadness than non-depressed participants but there
was no difference in how they responded to happy
stimuli, whereas Millgram, Joormann, et al. (2019)
found that depressed participants were less likely to
choose to upregulate their reactions to happy
stimuli than non-depressed participants, but there
were no differences in responses to sad stimuli.
These differences may, however, be accounted for
by differences in how the task was administered
across studies. For example, participants in Millgram
et al.’s (2015) study completed the tasks in a lab
setting in which active training was provided by a
researcher, whereas participants in Millgram, Joor-
mann, et al.’s (2019) study completed the tasks
online with written instructions. Therefore, additional
research is needed. Overall, the sample-weighted
average size of the relationship between mental
health disorders and choice of strategy was small
(r+ = 0.15, see Table 2).
Fifty-seven studies examined the association
between both state- and trait-like individual differ-
ences and intentions to regulate and/or emotion
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regulation choice. In terms of intentions to regulate,
the findings suggest that motivation to repair mood
may depend on levels of self-esteem (e.g. Wood
et al., 2009) and/or agreeableness (e.g. Cortes et al.,
2019), with higher levels of self-esteem and/or agree-
ableness typically associated with being more motiv-
ated to regulate emotions. Self-esteem has also been
associated with what strategies people choose to
regulate their emotions (Shafir, Guarino, et al., 2016)
and the stimuli that people choose to engage with
(Heimpel et al., 2002). Other individual differences
that have been associated with how people choose
to regulate their emotions include neuroticism
(Tamir, 2005), dispositional regulatory style (i.e. an
individual’s regulation tendencies, such as the ten-
dency to ruminate, Chen et al., 2007; Thoma et al.,
2012) and (dispositional) preferences for particular
emotions (Arens & Stangier, 2020; Tamir & Ford,
2012a).
Furthermore, several studies have found positive
relationships between people’s attitudes towards a
particular emotion and whether they choose to strive
for, or engage with, that emotion (Markovitch et al.,
2016, 2017). Emotion regulation choice has also been
found to be associated with people’s self-reported
and/or externally manipulated beliefs about particular
emotions, such including how much control they
believe they have over their emotions (e.g. Rovenpor
& Isbell, 2018; Wilson, 2018) and how useful they per-
ceive different emotions to be (e.g. self-reported per-
ceived utility, Tamir et al., 2015; Tamir & Ford, 2012a,
2012b). The typical finding here is that people prefer
emotions that they believe will be instrumental/
useful. Sample-weighted average effect sizes ranged
from medium (r+ = 0.18) to large (r+ = 0.38) for the
association between individual differences and
emotion regulation choice.
Social-cultural determinants
To date, ten studies have examined potential social
determinants of emotion regulation choice. For
example, the extent to which people feel the need
to belong within a group has been found to shape
emotional preferences (Porat, Halperin, Mannheim,
et al., 2016), with people being more motivated to
experience even negative group-based emotions
such as sadness if they believe that it will help them
to connect with their group. Political ideology has
also been found to influence people’s preferences
for group-based emotions (i.e. their motivation to
experience emotions as a member of a group) and
what strategy they typically choose to regulate
emotions. More specifically, Pliskin et al. (2018)
found liberals were more likely than conservatives to
choose distraction than reappraisal in response to
images depicting outgroup harm. Additionally,
when faced with a threat to their group, Porat et al.
(2018) found that liberals were more motivated than
conservatives to engage with stimuli that are likely
to lead them to experience collective angst. Taken
together, social determinants were found to have a
medium-sized association with emotional preferences
(r+ = 0.25, see Table 2).
Finally, only five studies have examined potential
cultural determinants of intentions to regulate and/
or emotion regulation choice to date. As described
above, culture has been found to shape intentions
to regulate (e.g. evidence suggests that American’s
prefer to savour positive emotions more than Asian
participants, Ma et al., 2018), but has also been
found to be associated with what strategies people
choose in response to high-intensity (but not low-
intensity) images. For example, Mehta et al. (2017)
found that Indian participants were more likely to
use reappraisal for high-intensity images than the
American participants. Therefore, although the evi-
dence base is currently quite limited, these studies
suggest that cultural factors may influence emotion
regulation choice.
General discussion
The present review sought to identify the determi-
nants both of whether people try to regulate their
emotions (i.e. intentions to regulate) and how
people choose to regulate their emotions (i.e.
emotion regulation choice). A systematic search
identified 219 studies that measured or manipulated
one or more potential determinants and examined
whether it influenced measures of intentions to regu-
late and/or emotion regulation choice. Drawing on
and extending Sheppes et al. (2014) framework, we
categorised the potential determinants as affective,
cognitive, motivational, individual, or social-cultural.
Where there was sufficient evidence (i.e. at least 5
studies), meta-analysis was used to quantify the size
of the relationships between the potential determi-
nants and the various measures of intentions to regu-
late and emotion regulation choice that have used in
the empirical studies to date.
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Overview of findings
Affective factors have been the most frequently
studied category of potential determinants to date
(k = 171). The findings from the primary studies
suggest that both intentions to regulate and
emotion regulation choice can be influenced by
general aspects of emotion, such as intensity (e.g.
Sheppes et al., 2011), valence (e.g. Kim, 2013; Roven-
por et al., 2013) and arousal (e.g. Bowman & Tambor-
ini, 2015), as well as more specific aspects of emotion,
such as the specific emotion to be regulated (e.g.
Vishkin et al., 2020) and the nature of the emotional
event (e.g. whether it is resolved or not, Tahlier
et al., 2013). Overall, affective factors typically had
medium-to-very large associations with intentions to
regulate and emotion regulation choice (effect sizes
ranged from r+ = 0.20 to 0.61).
Cognitive factors have been the least frequently
studied category to date (k = 12). Despite this, cogni-
tive factors do seem to influence both intentions to
regulate and also emotion regulation choice. For
example, the effort associated with regulating and
affordances or opportunities inherent within a stimu-
lus have both been found to influence whether a
person chooses to regulate using reappraisal (e.g.
Milyavsky et al., 2019; Young & Suri, 2020). As cogni-
tive determinants have only been considered with
respect to intentions to regulate and only two
measures of emotion regulation choice to date,
future research might not only examine the
influence of other cognitive factors on choice, but
also how cognitive determinants shape other
measures of emotion regulation choice (e.g. the
stimuli that people choose to engage with in an
attempt to control their emotions).
In terms of motivational factors, different goals,
such as temporal (e.g. Sheppes et al., 2014), direc-
tional (e.g. Millgram, Sheppes, et al., 2019), and situa-
tional/instrumental goals (e.g. Tamir & Ford, 2012a),
and also the nature of an upcoming task (e.g. creative
vs. analytical, Cohen & Andrade, 2004) or interaction
(e.g. Erber et al., 1996) have been found to influence
how people choose to regulate their emotions.
Taken together, based on the evidence reviewed, it
seems that people typically choose to direct their
emotions in a way that they believe will help them
to achieve a goal or prepare for a task, such as neutra-
lising their mood ahead of a social interaction (Erber
et al., 1996). Overall, the evidence to date suggests
that motivational factors typically have a very-large
sized relationship with emotion regulation choice
(r+ = 0.70).
Individual factors have been frequently examined
(k = 106) across both intentions to regulate and all
measures of emotion regulation choice. Findings to
date suggest that demographic factors (e.g. age,
Cohrdes et al., 2017; gender, Biswas et al., 1994),
mental health (e.g. Millgram et al., 2015) and both
trait-like and state-like individual differences, includ-
ing levels of neuroticism (Tamir, 2005) and beliefs
about the utility of emotions (e.g. Tamir et al., 2015)
influence both whether and how people choose to
regulate their emotions. The findings support the
idea that people typically choose to regulate in
ways that are consistent with their individual ten-
dencies (e.g. Chen et al., 2007), attitudes (e.g. Marko-
vitch et al., 2016, 2017), and beliefs (e.g. Tamir &
Ford, 2012a, 2012b). The findings also suggested
that older people are more likely to choose to regu-
late their emotions in a more pro-hedonic manner
(e.g. Cohrdes et al., 2017); and that gender is associ-
ated with emotion regulation choice, but that the
findings to date with respect to how gender is associ-
ated with emotion regulation choice are mixed (e.g.
Erber et al., 1996; Tamir et al., 2015). Individual
factors typically have a small-to-large sized relation-
ships with intentions to regulate and emotion regu-
lation choice (effect sizes ranged from r+ = 0.18 to
0.38).
The final category of potential determinants that
we identified in the present review were social-cul-
tural factors. Compared to the other potential deter-
minants of emotion regulation choice, social-cultural
determinants were relatively understudied, which is
perhaps surprising given extensive evidence on the
influence and importance of contextual determinants
on emotion regulation more generally (see, for
example, Greenaway et al., 2018 for a review).
However, the evidence to date suggests that social
determinants typically have a medium-sized relation-
ship with emotion regulation choice (r+ = 0.25) and,
together, provide preliminary evidence that both
the immediate social context and the broader cultural
context can influence whether and how someone
chooses to regulate their emotions.
A framework for understanding intentions to
regulate and emotion regulation choice
Figure 2 proposes a framework for understanding
emotion regulation choice. The framework was
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generated applying the guidelines outlined by Fusar-
Poli and Radua (2018) to the findings of the present
review determine whether the evidence that a given
factor is associated with intentions to regulate and/
or emotion regulation choice is (i) convincing, (ii)
highly suggestive, (iii) suggestive, (iv) weak, or (v)
non-significant (see Table 3).5 Determinants for
which we found “highly suggestive” or “convincing”
evidence were reliably associated with at least one
measure of emotion regulation choice were included
in the framework (shown in normal font). We recog-
nise, however, that the evidence to date regarding
whether and how people choose to regulate their
emotions is relatively limited in terms of both the
potential determinants that have been studied and
the number of studies examining particular determi-
nants. Therefore, our proposed framework for under-
standing emotion regulation choice also includes
factors that seem likely to be associated with
whether and how people choose to regulate their
emotions, but that have received insufficient empiri-
cal attention to date (these factors are show in italic
font).
The resulting framework makes it clear that
whether and how people choose to regulate their
emotions is influenced by affective, individual, moti-
vational, and social-cultural determinants. The evi-
dence regarding affective factors such as the
valence, arousal and intensity of the emotional situ-
ation is “highly suggestive”, indicating they are
reliably associated with emotion regulation choice.
We also found that the individual determinants of
demographic factors such as age and gender, and
individual differences such as self-esteem and beliefs
and attitudes about emotions were reliably associated
with emotion regulation choice. Furthermore, motiva-
tional determinants, such as the goal of the current
situation and social-contextual determinants such as
political ideology and the need to belong were
reliably associated with at least one measure of
emotion regulation choice. Taken together then, the
present review suggests that people making decisions
about how to regulate their emotions are sensitive to
factors relating to themselves, the emotion they are
regulating, and also the immediate situation and
broader social context that the regulation attempt is
taking place in.
In terms of factors that seem likely to be associated
with whether and how people choose to regulate
their emotions, but that have received insufficient
empirical attention to date, the present review high-
lights that only a few studies have examined
whether and how the social and cultural context influ-
ences emotion regulation choice (e.g. Ma et al., 2018;
Mehta et al., 2017, Study 3). This is perhaps surprising
as a number of studies have examined the effect of
culture on other facets of emotion regulation, such
as the use of regulatory strategies (e.g. De Leersnyder
et al., 2013; Matsumoto et al., 2008; Mauss et al., 2010).
Thus, the proposed framework includes culture, and
we call for further research to understand whether
and how people choices about emotion regulation
are shaped by cultural determinants.
Similarly, there were only sufficient studies to
examine the magnitude of the relationship between
one of the identified determinants (namely, the
Figure 2. Framework for understanding the determinants of intentions to regulate and emotion regulation choice.
Note. Factors that seem likely to be associated with whether and how people choose to control their emotions but have not received sufficient empirical attention
to date are presented in italics, while factors for which convincing evidence has emerged are in normal font.
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Intensity 390 0.46 (0.25, 0.63) <.001 [−0.04, 0.77] 66.08% No/No 0.27 (0.10, 0.43) Weak
Choice of strategy
Intensity 2499 0.61 (0.53, 0.68) <.001 [−0.05, 0.90] 86.54% No/No 0.64 (0.52, 0.73) Highly Suggestive
Valence 370 0.41 (−0.07, 0.73) .003 [−0.73, 0.95] 93.19% No/No 0.07 (−0.14, 0.27) Weak
Specific Emo. 413 0.20 (−0.01, 0.39) .001 [−0.26, 0.58] 62.48% No/No 0.43 (0.25, 0.58) Weak
Affordances 295 0.10 (−0.03, 0.23) .032 [−0.03, 0.23] 0.00% No/Yes 0.16 (−0.05, 0.36) Weak
Mental health 311 0.15 (0.01, 0.29) .004 [0.01, 0.29] 0.00% No/Yes 0.20 (−0.02, 0.40) Weak
Individual diff. 605 0.18 (0.10, 0.26) <.001 [0.10, 0.26] 0.00% No/No 0.18 (0.04, 0.31) Highly Suggestive
Choice of stimuli
Valence 3192 0.32 (0.21, 0.42) <.001 [−0.10, 0.64] 84.23% No/No 0.14 (0.04, 0.26) Highly Suggestive
Arousal 790 0.47 (0.10, 0.72) .003 [−0.56, 0.93] 94.87% No/No 0.16 (0.03, 0.29) Highly Suggestive
Age 863 0.19 (0.08, 0.30) <.001 [0.00, 0.37] 31.79% No/No 0.26 (0.02, 0.28) Highly Suggestive
Gender 600 0.23 (0.12, 0.33) <.001 [0.12, 0.33] 0.00% No/Yes 0.24 (0.11, 0.36) Highly Suggestive
Individual diff. 2305 0.27 (0.21, 0.33) <.001 [0.08, 0.44] 46.18% No/Yes 0.31 (0.22, 0.39) Highly Suggestive
Time spent with stimuli
Valence 1969 0.21 (0.15, 0.40) <.001 [−0.15, 0.62] 81.52% No/Yes 0.20 (0.08, 0.32) Highly Suggestive
Age 1081 0.17 (0.11, 0.23) <.001 [0.11, 0.23] 0.00% No/No 0.11 (−0.02, 0.24) Suggestive
Individual diff. 689 0.21 (0.01, 0.40) .004 [−0.23, 0.58] 72.11% No/No 0.35 (0.24, 0.45) Suggestive
Emotional preferences
Valence 4104 0.22 (0.25, 0.30) <.001 [0.02, 0.45] 60.39% Yes/Yes 0.13 (0.05, 0.22) Highly Suggestive
Goal 839 0.70 (0.40, 0.84) <.001 [−0.43, 0.97] 95.81% No/No 0.55 (0.43, 0.64) Highly Suggestive
Gender 838 0.21(0.13, 0.28) <.001 [0.11, 0.29] 3.59% Yes/Yes 0.20 (0.05, 0.34) Highly Suggestive
Individual diff. 2214 0.38 (0.27, 0.49) <.001 [−0.20, 0.77] 88.78% No/No 0.46 (0.43, 0.70) Highly Suggestive
Social context 764 0.25 (0.19, 0.31) <.001 [0.19, 0.31] 0.00% No/No 0.22 (0.09, 0.34) Highly Suggestive
Note. Criteria for concluding that evidence is convincing: > 1000 cases, p < .001, I2 < 50%, 95% prediction interval excludes zero, no evidence of small-study effects and no evidence of excess
significance bias.
Criteria for concluding that evidence is highly suggestive: > 500 cases, p < .001 and largest study with the 95% CI excludes zero.
Criteria for concluding that evidence is suggestive: > 500 cases and p < .001.





















intensity of the emotional situation) and intentions to
regulate. Intentions to regulate are likely to depend
on the outcome of a cost–benefit analysis in which
people consider the value, feasibility, and perceived
cost of the effort required to achieve the emotion
regulation goal (Milyavsky et al., 2019; Shenhav
et al., 2013, 2017; Tamir, 2020). Therefore, future
research may want to examine whether and how
other factors that shape the relative costs vs.
benefits of regulation shape intentions to regulate.
For example, injunctive and descriptive norms have
been associated with intentions to engage with
other behaviours (Borsari & Carey, 2003; Rivis &
Sheeran, 2003), and therefore could influence inten-
tions to regulate emotions. For example, people
may be more likely to regulate when they believe
that others would approve of their doing so and/or
that others would regulate in a similar situation.
Further research on intentions to regulate and the
putative determinants of intentions would strengthen
this aspect of the proposed framework for under-
standing intentions to regulate and emotion regu-
lation choice.
The framework also suggests that it may be valuable
to differentiate between relatively proximal determi-
nants of emotion regulation choice and more distal
determinants. Proximal determinants can be con-
sidered as more immediate factors that may have
more direct effects on emotion regulation choice,
whereas distal determinants may have more indirect
effects on emotion regulation choice. As seen in
Figure 2, we propose that some of the factors identified
may bemoredistal determinants, namely the individual
and social-cultural determinants, whereas the affective,
motivation and cognitive determinants may be more
proximal determinants of emotion regulation choice.
Furthermore, it is possible that the proximal determi-
nants suggest mechanisms by which the more distal
determinants influence how people choose to regulate
their emotions. For example, the effect of individual
determinants, such as age or gender, on emotion regu-
lation choicemay bemediated bymore proximal deter-
minants, such as the valence of the emotion to be
regulated. That is, older people may be more likely to
choose to engage with more positive stimuli or to
immediately reduce negative emotions by choosing
distraction over reappraisal because they prioritise opti-
mising their immediatewell-being and prefer to experi-
ence positive emotions (Carstensen, 2006; Carstensen
et al., 1999). Future studies may aim to directly
examine the framework proposed here.
Limitations and future directions
One advantage of identifying and categorising the
potential determinants of emotion regulation
choice, along with measures of emotion regulation
choice, is that it provides a means to organise the
growing number of empirical studies examining
emotion regulation choice. However, this approach
also reveals gaps in the empirical work conducted to
date. For example, the impact of specific determinants
on emotion regulation choice has typically been eval-
uated with respect to specific measures of emotion
regulation choice (i.e. within specific paradigms).
Fifty-eight of the studies we included examined the
intensity of the emotion, but 51 of these studies
looked at the impact of intensity on participants’
choice of strategy; no studies considered whether
and how the intensity of the emotion influences
peoples’ preferences for stimuli or the amount of
time that they spend viewing particular stimuli in an
effort to regulate their emotions. Likewise, 17
studies examined whether salient goals affected
choice, but 10 of these studies measured emotion
regulation choice in terms of participants’ preferences
for stimuli. Thus, it is difficult to compare the various
determinants, as some determinants have only been
considered with respect to some (and sometimes
only one) measure of emotion regulation choice.
Additionally, the impact of specific determinants
has often been examined using the same measures
and/or manipulations. Future research may want to
consider examining the influence of these potential
determinants of emotion regulation choice using
different paradigms and/or measures in an effort to
provide a conceptual replication. For example,
emotional intensity is often manipulated through
the use of images, but the intensity of emotions is
not only shaped by aspects of the situation (i.e. the
images that participants look at), but also aspects of
the individual, such as how sensitive they are (Aron
et al., 2012; Jagiellowicz et al., 2016). Furthermore, it
is possible that some of the measures of emotion
regulation choice that we identified, such as the
stimuli that participants choose to engage with, may
confound people’s goals (i.e. the emotional state
they want to achieve by regulating) with the strategy
that they choose to achieve the desired outcome (i.e.
engaging with goal-congruent stimuli). Therefore,
future research should also try to disentangle
emotional goals from the means to do so (Tamir
et al., 2020).
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It is also worth noting that the studies included in
this review studied emotion regulation choice in the
laboratory or collected data online, which may raise
questions regarding the ecological validity of the
findings. Although some studies conducted in the
field have purportedly measured emotion regulation
choice, they typically do so by measuring the use of
emotion regulation strategies (e.g. English et al.,
2017; Wilms et al., 2020), which may not necessarily
reflect a conscious, active choice (Sheppes, 2020).
For example, many behaviours occur automatically
and are driven by habits rather than deliberate
choice (e.g. Neal et al., 2011) – something that also
occurs when regulating emotions (Koole et al.,
2015; Mauss et al., 2007). Therefore, while studies
using experience sampling help to understand
what strategies people use in daily life, they may
not accurately measure what strategies people
choose in particular situation. Consequently, future
research may choose to test hypotheses proposed
by the framework presented in Figure 2 outside of
the laboratory, to address possible concerns regard-
ing the ecological validity of current research on
emotion regulation choice. For example, experience
sampling methods could include explicit questions
about the strategies that people chose in particular
situations.
Based on the evidence reviewed, there are
several other possible avenues for future research.
For example, some factors (e.g. level of arousal
and gender) have had a mixed effect on emotion
regulation choice; therefore, the precise nature of
the effects may warrant further examination. Simi-
larly, there is limited evidence regarding the effect
of particular determinants, such as social-cultural
factors. The importance of these factors in
emotion regulation has previously been highlighted
(see Greenaway et al., 2018), therefore this may
prove to be a fruitful area for future research.
Finally, the effect of some factors (e.g. goals and
incentives) has only been investigated using manip-
ulations that provide participants with a goal and/or
incentive. Such goals are therefore externally deter-
mined. Given that externally vs. autonomously
motivated goals have been found to have quite
different impacts on a range of outcomes (for a
review, see Ryan & Deci, 2000), future research
may measure people’s personally held goals or
incentives to examine the influence of these on
whether and how people choose to control their
emotions.
Conclusion
The present research responded to the need for a sys-
tematic review of the empirical work to date examin-
ing whether and how people choose to regulate their
emotions. Eighteen potential determinants of inten-
tions to regulate and/or emotion regulation choice
were identified; 11 of which had been studied
sufficiently frequently (i.e. k > 5) to allow meta-analy-
sis to estimate the magnitude of the relationship
between the potential determinant and the measure
(s) of emotion regulation choice. The findings identify
affective, cognitive, motivational, individual, and
social-cultural determinants that are associated with
emotion regulation choice, suggesting that decisions
about how to regulate are influenced by aspects of
the individual doing the regulating, the emotion
that is being regulated, as well as the immediate situ-
ation and broader context in which the regulation is
taking place. This being said, it is also clear that
further research is needed, especially regarding
potential determinants of intentions to regulate and
the influence of some determinants on some
measures of choice. It is our hope that categorising
the potential determinants and measures of
emotion regulation choice, along with the proposed
framework for understanding emotion regulation
choice, provides the basis for a coordinated and sys-
tematic programme of research to understand
whether and how people regulate their emotions.
Notes
1. Choices between regulatory strategies can also be
referred to as “regulatory selection choices” (Sheppes,
2020).
2. This meant that studies using the Emotion Regulation
Questionnaire (Gross & John, 2003), the Emotion Regu-
lation Profile – Revised (Nelis et al., 2011), or experience
sampling methods (e.g., English et al., 2017) were typically
excluded because they assess which strategies were used
or are typically used in different situations. Although a
number of studies have referred to the ERP-R as a
measure of emotion regulation choice (e.g., Ortner et al.,
2017, 2018), this measure asks participants to identify
how they would typically respond to situations. Therefore,
people are likely to report what they have previously used
in these situations, rather than what they would necess-
arily choose to do.
3. Similarly, studies which focused on the consumption of
food and/or drink were excluded as it could not be deter-
mined whether what the participants were eating and/or
the amount that they consumed reflected a choice that
was intended to regulate emotions and/or whether the
emotions induced regulated participants food intake.
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4. Adjusted effect sizes are denoted using r+ adj and funnel
plots for each of the relationships can be found at
https://osf.io/xpzyf/
5. Due to the limited number of studies examining the
association between some of the factors and emotion
regulation choice, we amended Fusar-Poli and Radua’s
criteria and used the benchmark for the number of
cases to be greater than 500 (as opposed to 1000) for
the evidence to be classed as either “suggestive” or
“highly suggestive”. Additionally, as Meta-Essentials
only reports significance to 3 decimal places, we
amended the significance level to p < .001, for “sugges-
tive”, “highly suggestive” and “convincing” evidence
(from p < .00001). All of the other criteria remained the
same.
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